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Section 5: Logic & scientiﬁc method
VERISIMILITUDE MEETS EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT
Sjoerd D. Zwart Gerard R. Renardel de Lavalette
Department of Philosophy Department of Computing Science
University of Amsterdam University of Groningen
Nieuwe Doelenstraat 15 P.O. Box 800
1012 CP AMSTERDAM 9700 AV GRONINGEN
e-mail: s.zwart@hum.uva.nl e-mail: grl@cs.rug.nl
Verisimilitude
The hypothetical—deductive method lacks an explanation of scientiﬁc progress, and Popper pro-
posed his theory of verisimilitude to ﬁll this gap. The overall idea was to show that the critical
method, i.e. proposing daring hypotheses to explain the relevant phenomena, and subsequently
putting them under the severest possible scrutiny, will eventually lead to better theories. Popper’s
verisimilitude deﬁnition, however, failed since it could not compare two diﬀerent false theories.
The non-problematic and basic clause of Popper’s deﬁnition reads ϕ ≤+ ψ iﬀ ϕ  ψ ∨ τ , and we
work with the extension of this basic clause, ≤v
τ
, developed by the ﬁrst author in [1, Ch.6]. The
theory of ψ, Cn(ψ), is, regarding the true theory Cn(τ ), at least as verisimilar as Cn(ϕ) iﬀ ψ ≤v
τ
ϕ.
To answer the epistemic question of verisimilitude we turned to the theory of belief revision; and,
without any premeditation, it turned out to ﬁt very well to the reﬁned verisimilitude deﬁnition.
Belief revision
Eschewing any reference to the concept of truth whatsoever, belief revisionists focus on the revision
K ∗ ϕ of a deductively closed belief set K in the light of ϕ. This is simply Cn(K ∧ ϕ) if K ∧ ϕ
is consistent, and otherwise K ∗ ϕ := Cn(K− ∧ ϕ) for some K− ⊆ K with K−  ¬ϕ. It is well
known that for any K, K− may be deﬁned in terms of an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤e
K
on
K, where χ ≤e
K
ψ mirrors the willingness of the believer to give up χ and keep ψ, rather than give
up ψ and keep χ; that is: ψ is epistemically more entrenched than χ. E.g. let K := Cn(p ∧ ¬q),
τ := Cn(p ∧ q), ϕ := p ↔ q and p ≤e
K
¬q, then K ∗ φ := Cn(¬p ∧ ¬q) is less verisimilar then K.
This revision shows that updating with true information may lead us away from the truth.
The main result




are similar (in some
natural sense) and ϕ is true (i.e. τ  ϕ), then the new theory K ∗ ϕ is at least as close to the
true theory Cn(τ ) as the original theory K, i.e. K ∗ ϕ ≤v
τ
K. In other words, the mechanism of
our conceptual framework guarantees that updating with true evidence results in a theory that
is at least as close to the truth as the original theory, provided that the epistemic entrenchment
relation and the verisimilitude ordering of the sentences of the old theory coincide. Thus, under
the proviso mentioned, and in Popperian spirit, updating with true information will us lead closer
to the truth.
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